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Previous studies have observed different onset times for the neural markers of conscious
perception. This variability could be attributed to procedural differences between
studies. Here we show that the onset times for the markers of conscious visual
perception can strongly vary even within a single study. A heterogeneous stimulus set
was presented at threshold contrast. Trials with and without conscious perception were
contrasted on 100 balanced subsets of the data. Importantly, the 100 subsets with
heterogeneous stimuli did not differ in stimulus content, but only with regard to specific
trials used. This approach enabled us to study general markers of conscious visual
perception independent of stimulus content, characterize their onset and its variability
within one study. N200 and P300 were the two reliable markers of conscious visual
perception common to all perceived stimuli and absent for all non-perceived stimuli. The
estimated mean onset latency for both markers was shortly after 200 ms. However, the
onset latency of these markers was associated with considerable variability depending
on which subsets of the data were considered. We show that it is first and foremost
the amplitude fluctuation in the condition without conscious perception that explains the
observed variability in onset latencies of the markers of conscious visual perception.
Keywords: NCC, consciousness, variability, P300, VAN, ERP, denoising
INTRODUCTION
How long does it take from the moment when a stimulus is presented in the environment until the
conscious experience of the stimulus starts to arise? Despite the decades-long quest for the neural
correlates of consciousness (NCC) it is not known at what time after stimulus onset they occur.
Some results suggest that conscious perception is a relatively late process (Sergent et al., 2005; Del
Cul et al., 2007). Others point to the importance of mid-latency markers (Koivisto and Revonsuo,
2010). Still others have found very early correlates for conscious perception (Pins and Ffytche, 2003;
Aru and Bachmann, 2009).
One reason for these discrepancies may be that the contrastive method typically used to identify
NCC is not only sensitive regarding the actual NCC but also unravels neural processes that precede
or follow conscious perception (Overgaard, 2004; Bachmann, 2009; Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf
et al., 2012). The contrastive method is supposed to identify markers that are uniquely present
or reliably more strongly present in the averaged activity of the condition where a stimulus was
consciously perceived compared to the condition where a stimulus was not consciously perceived.
However, the markers directly related to conscious perception may not be the only ones that diﬀer
between these conditions. Depending on how visual awareness is manipulated and assessed within
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 1 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 23
Rutiku et al. General Markers of NCC
a given paradigm, neural prerequisites (NCC-pr) and neural
consequences (NCC-co) speciﬁc to that paradigm may be
misclassiﬁed as NCC proper (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al.,
2012).
Procedural diﬀerences between studies can inﬂuence the
presence as well as the characteristics of the three types of NCC.
If experiments employ restricted categories of stimuli it is hard to
tell whether the resulting NCC are markers of only one category
or whether they can be generalized to other categories as well. For
example, the N170 may be a marker of category speciﬁc NCC-pr
or even NCC proper only for faces (Navajas et al., 2013; Shafto
and Pitts, 2015). It is also known that the latency of processes
correlating with consciousness may shift as much as 100 ms
depending on stimulus predictability (Melloni et al., 2011). If the
stimulus set of a study consists of only a few items then perceptual
events inevitably become more predictable and the latencies
might shift accordingly (Melloni et al., 2011). Finally, speciﬁcs
of the experimental setting or task requirements may even
inﬂuence ongoing pre-stimulus activity which can nonetheless
have a robust eﬀect on subsequent stimulus perception and thus
possibly also on the related markers of NCC (see Busch et al.,
2009 and Mathewson et al., 2009 for two excellent studies on
pre-stimulus predictors of conscious perception). Taken together,
the fact that a wide variety of diﬀerent paradigms, stimulus
material, recording conditions etc. have been used to study
NCC might at least in part explain why many studies have
reported largely diﬀerent signatures and onset times of NCC (see
Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010; Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 for
an overview).
However, there might be yet another reason for the
discrepancies: maybe the markers of NCC arise at diﬀerent
times even within a study. It has never been tested whether the
markers of NCC are reliably identiﬁable with a speciﬁc latency
within one study where the paradigm, stimulus material and
recording conditions are kept constant. If the same subjects
perform the same task over and over again, would contrasting
the resulting seen and unseen trials (or representative samples
thereof) always lead to comparably similar results in terms of
when and where the NCC arise? Looking closer at the rationale
behind the contrastive method suggests that this may not be the
case. The reliability and onset latency of the markers of the NCC
might be aﬀected by a number of diﬀerent factors evenwithin one
study.
It is possible that the latency of the NCC shifts from trial
to trial. This would spread out the averaged activity in the
condition with conscious perception and the mean onset latency
of NCC would become less accurate. A similar eﬀect has been
demonstrated for the face-sensitive N170 component if stimulus
uncertainty is increased due to added noise (Navajas et al., 2013).
In the worst case scenario latency jitter may even hide the
NCC from the contrastive analysis altogether. Results from a
contrastive analysis may also be inﬂuenced by factors not directly
related to the NCC. Diﬀerent noise proﬁles may accompany the
signal in diﬀerent trials (Arieli et al., 1996). Again, this would
inﬂuence the onset latency of NCC. One assumes that task-
irrelevant noise is mostly averaged out when means are created
over trials, but this is of course not completely true and is
particularly problematic if the number of trials diﬀers between
the contrasted conditions.
To make matters worse, one cannot even be sure that it
is only the signal and noise proﬁles of the condition with
conscious perception that dictate NCC reliability and onset
latency. The above described concerns apply to the condition
without conscious perception as well. This is because for
delineating NCC, trials with conscious perception are compared
against those without conscious perception of the target stimulus.
Only the signiﬁcant diﬀerences are considered as candidates of
NCC (Aru et al., 2012), but the reliability and timing of these
signiﬁcant diﬀerences also depends on the trials in the condition
without conscious perception.
The last consideration is particularly noteworthy in light of the
recent work by Schurger et al. (2015). Their results suggest that
the pattern of activity in response to unseen stimuli is less stable
within and between trials than the pattern of activity in response
to seen trials. They used a measure of representational similarity
called directional variance. This measure describes how stable
the topographic pattern is within a given time window. Note
that although directional variance is more sophisticated than the
simple ERP calculation the logic behind it is quite similar. It is the
core assumption behind ERPs as well that if activity consistently
occurs at the same time over trials then it is preserved after
averaging whereas inconsistent activity is averaged out. Thus, if
directional variance is higher in trials of the unseen condition
(Schurger et al., 2015) then it is prudent to assume that ERPs
of the unseen condition should also be more variable. Most
importantly, this variability will be reﬂected in the reliability and
onset latency of NCC if the contrastive analysis method is used.
In other words, trials from the unconscious condition might
directly aﬀect the estimated timing of the ERP changes reﬂecting
the NCC.
Taken together, there are several reasons why NCC as
identiﬁed by a contrastive analysis may vary even within one
single study. In order to arrive at a better understanding of
the NCC it would be necessary to know how much each
of these factors contributes to the results of a contrastive
analysis. Surprisingly, however, it has not yet been thoroughly
characterized how much NCC actually vary when only the data
from one experiment are considered.
The present study was designed to address the above
described issues. To overcome some of the methodological
restrictions of previous studies we employed an experimental
paradigm where the role of visual categorical restriction and
stimulus predictability were reduced. To that end we used
many diﬀerent stimuli with varying characteristics and presented
these stimuli on perceptual threshold. We hypothesized that
for the described paradigm there is at least one marker that
distinguishes consciously perceived trials of our heterogeneous
visual stimulus set from the non-perceived trials. We call this
the general marker of NCC, gmNCC in short. Note, that with
“general” we refer to the content-independent nature of the
hypothesized gmNCC, because any single stimulus speciﬁc NCC-
pr, NCC proper, and/or NCC-co would not have a critical
impact on results if so many diﬀerent stimuli are considered
together.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 23
Rutiku et al. General Markers of NCC
Our ﬁrst goal was to investigate which EEG correlates qualify
as gmNCC in our experimental paradigm. Our second goal was
to study the reliability and any possible variability in the onset
latency of gmNCC. Our third goal was to characterize the causes
of this variability as thoroughly as possible. To achieve these
goals, 100 matched subsets of seen and unseen trials were created
by repeatedly sampling from the pool of all available trials. This
procedure (depicted in Figure 2) ensured that objective stimulus
content always stayed the same for both conditions while the
included trials diﬀered from one matching iteration to another.
By performing a contrastive analysis on each of the 100 matched
subsets of seen and unseen trials separately and by analyzing
variability within these results we show that amplitude variance in
the unseen condition has a profound inﬂuence on gmNCC onset
latency and sometimes obscures the gmNCC altogether. Thus,
our research may shed light on the question why diﬀerent studies
have found diﬀerent markers of NCC or report largely diﬀerent
onset times of these markers.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Subjects
Twenty-two subjects participated in the EEG experiment. All
subjects were healthy and had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. Data from four subjects were not included in the analyses
due to a high number of noisy electrodes or too many trials
with artifacts. The remaining 18 subjects (eight male) were 18–
31 years old (mean = 23.2, median = 22, SD = 3.6). One subject
was left-handed. All subjects gave written informed consent
prior to participation and received monetary compensation as
a reward. The study was approved by the ethics committee
of University of Tartu and the experiment was undertaken in
compliance with national legislation and the Declaration of
Helsinki.
Stimuli
The stimulus set consisted of 70 monochrome drawings. The
drawings depicted objects from six diﬀerent categories. Four
categories were further divided into line-drawings and solid
forms. Thus, there were 10 diﬀerent types of stimuli: (1) line-
drawings of graphical ﬁgures, (2) solid graphical ﬁgures, (3) short
words, (4) line-drawings of man-made objects, (5) solid forms of
man-made objects, (6) line-drawings of faces, (7) line-drawings
of animated nature, (8) solid forms of animated nature, (9) line-
drawings of inanimate nature, (10) solid forms of inanimate
nature. Figure 1 depicts all 70 stimuli sorted by stimulus
type. Stimuli were collected from online databases. Occasionally,
stimuli were edited manually to keep the number of ﬁlled
pixels, i.e., the contrast energy comparable for all solid forms
including text and all line-drawings including faces. There were
no important reasons why particular stimulus types or exemplars
were chosen. The aim was simply to generate a heterogeneous
stimulus set that is comparable to many other related studies.
Solid forms were included in addition to line drawings so that
both high- and low-frequency information would be presented
to the subjects.
FIGURE 1 | All stimuli sorted by type. Each row depicts all seven
exemplars of one stimulus type. Rows are ordered according to the numbers
under which the stimulus types are listed in the methods section “Stimuli.” The
contrast of the stimuli was changed to render them near-threshold, thus
making them lighter or darker.
In order to display stimuli at perceptual threshold (i.e., 50%
seen responses) their contrast has to be accordingly low. Not all
of our stimuli have the same threshold contrast, however. An
earlier pilot experiment indicated that for the present stimulus
set there are ﬁve groups of stimuli with roughly similar threshold
contrasts within each group: text, solid graphical ﬁgures, line-
drawings of graphical ﬁgures, solid forms of all other ﬁgures and
line-drawings of all other ﬁgures. Thus, contrast was adjusted
separately for each of these ﬁve groups with the help of a short
pre-experiment prior to the main experiment (see S1 in the
Supplementary Material).
Stimuli were presented on a light gray background. Stimulus
size was approximately 2.5◦ of visual angle. Prior to the stimulus
a ﬁxation cross was presented. The response screen contained the
question “Did you see something?” in the Estonian language. S2
in the Supplementary Material contains more information about
the physical characteristics of stimuli.
Task and Design
Subjects were seated in a dark room, 80 cm from the monitor
(SUN CM751U; 1024 × 768 pixels; 100 Hz refresh rate). Each
session began with a short pre-experiment to determine the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 3 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 23
Rutiku et al. General Markers of NCC
appropriate threshold contrasts for each subject (see S1 in the
Supplementary Material), followed by the main experiment. The
main experiment comprised 770 trials in total. Each of the 70
stimuli was presented 10 times. There were also 70 catch trials
where no stimulus was presented. The order of the trials was fully
randomized. Each trial began with the presentation of a ﬁxation
cross in the middle of the screen for 500 ms. The ﬁxation cross
was followed by a blank screen for 750–1250ms in order to obtain
a clean EEG baseline without the ERP of the ﬁxation cross onset
or oﬀset. Then the stimulus was presented in the middle of the
screen for one refresh frame, i.e., for 10 ms, followed again by the
blank screen. After 1 s the response screen appeared.
Subjects were instructed to ﬁxate on the cross in the middle of
the screen, not to blink until the response screen had appeared,
and then to report via button press on a standard keyboard
whether they perceived a stimulus on a given trial or not. Seen
and unseen responses were given with diﬀerent hands, but the
designated hands were balanced across subjects. There was a
break after every 154 trials.
EEG Recording and Preprocessing
A Nexstim eXimia EEG-system with 60 carbon electrodes cap
(Nexstim Ltd, Helsinki, Finland) was used. All 60 electrodes
of the extended 10–20 system were prepared for recording.
The reference electrode was placed on the forehead, slightly
to the right. The impedance at all electrodes was kept below
15 K. The EEG signal was sampled at 1450 Hz and ampliﬁed
with a gain of 2000. The bandwidth of the signal was ca. 0.1–
350 Hz. As our system only allows one pair of eye-electrodes the
horizontal electrooculogram (HEOG) was recorded by placing
the respective electrodes a few millimeters from the outer canthi
of both eyes. Note that blinks could be easily identiﬁed in the EEG
of posterior scalp sites because the reference electrode was placed
on the forehead.
EEG data was preprocessed with Fieldtrip1 (version 01-01-
2013). Trials were epoched around stimulus onset (–500 to
+700 ms), re-referenced to the average reference and baseline
corrected with a 100 ms time period before stimulus onset. All
trials containing artifacts were identiﬁed by visual inspection.
Trials containing blinks, eye movements, strong muscle activity
or other artifacts were completely removed from the data. Noisy
signals were interpolated with the nearest neighbor method (see
S3 in the Supplementary Material). The 11.6% of trials were
rejected due to artifacts on average (median = 10.7%, SD = 6%,
range = 4–26.9%) and 2.6% of the data was interpolated on
average (median = 2.6%, SD = 1.8%, range = 0.1–6.3%). Data
were ﬁltered with a 30 Hz low-pass zero phase shift Butterworth
ﬁlter.
Data Analysis
The behavioral analysis was carried out with the R programming
language2 (version 3.1.0). As contrasts had to be readjusted
occasionally during the main experiment (see S1 in the
SupplementaryMaterial), detection rate also varied in accordance
1http://ﬁeldtrip.fcdonders.nl
2http://www.r-project.org/
with the diﬀerent levels of contrast. In order to eliminate this
accountable variance from the behavioral results only those
contrast levels are considered which comprise the most trials.
Thus, 93.3% of all available trials are considered (SD over
subjects = 9%; SD over types of stimuli = 2.8%). We must note,
however, that results are comparable when all available trials are
considered.
EEG data was analyzed with Fieldtrip as well as with R.
Trial Matching Procedure
In order to ﬁnd the gmNCC, to study their reliability and any
possible variability in their onset latency within one study 100
diﬀerent matched sets of seen and unseen trials were constructed
per subject. The trial matching procedure serves two goals.
First, it guarantees that the two contrasted conditions (seen and
unseen) are identical with respect to objective stimulus content.
Second, it allows us to repeat the contrastive analysis for 100
objectively equivalent matched sets of trials. Hence one can
investigate whether the resulting NCC are also equivalent on
every iteration.
Figure 2 illustrates the trial matching procedure. Each of the
100 sets was composed as follows. For every stimulus an equal
number of seen and unseen trials were included in the respective
conditions. Thus, the algorithm would select a stimulus (the
number “3” in the upper left end of Figure 2, for example) and
count how many seen and how many unseen trials there are for
this stimulus per subject (e.g., 3 vs. 7). It would then take all three
seen trials and randomly choose three out of the seven unseen
trials. The algorithm would do the same for all 70 stimuli and
pool the chosen trials together into their respective conditions
for each subject separately. In case the contrast for one particular
stimulus had to be readjusted after the ﬁrst block of the main
experiment (see S1 in the Supplementary Material) the algorithm
would choose an equal number of seen and unseen trials for each
contrast separately.
This random selection of subsets was repeated 100 times for
each subject. As a result both the seen and the unseen condition
always comprised an equal number of trials for each subject
on each iteration of the set matching procedure (m = 122,
median= 123, SD= 31, range= 62–177). Furthermore, although
there are obvious objective diﬀerences between categories of
stimuli each matched set of seen and unseen trials consists of
the same number of objectively identical stimuli. That holds
true for stimulus content as well as for visual parameters
(e.g., contrast energy), because the stimulation parameters were
ﬁxed throughout the experiment. Importantly, neither stimulus
content nor visual parameters could change between matched
subsets, i.e., stimulus content and visual parameters were
identical not only between seen and unseen sets of trials within
one iteration of the trial matching procedure but between all of
them – all the 200 sets of trials (100 iterations × 2 conditions)
were objectively identical. Hence, physical diﬀerences between
subsets of stimuli cannot explain any variability in the ERP results
from contrastive analyses.
Note that although as a consequence of the trial matching
procedure only speciﬁc subsets of all available data are considered
in the contrastive analyses the amount of trials is still more
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FIGURE 2 | Illustration of the trial matching procedure. The uppermost row indicates all 70 stimuli with one stimulus of each type in the front as examples. Each
stimulus was presented 10 times over the course of the experiment. On some of these trials the stimulus was seen, on others it was not. In the second row, from
above each stroke represents one trial. Seen trials are blue, unseen trials are orange. Note that, for simplicity a total of 10 trials for each stimulus is depicted, but in
reality some of these trials were removed during the artifact rejection step of EEG analysis. Therefore, not all stimuli actually had 10 trials left in total. The trial
matching procedure would go through all of the 70 stimuli and take the maximal equal amount of seen and unseen trials per stimulus by randomly choosing from the
more numerous condition. Three iterations of the total 100 iterations of the trial matching procedure are illustrated as examples. Finally, all the seen and unseen trials
that were selected on a given iteration of the trial matching procedure are collapsed into the overall seen and unseen condition and averaged. This step is done for
each single iteration, but is here illustrated only for the 100th iteration as an example.
than typically included or even considered necessary for reliable
estimates in ERP research (especially for large components such
as the P300; see Luck (2005) for a discussion on this topic).
After all, even if other studies have used all the recorded trials
available to them they are nevertheless also analyzing only a
subset of an inﬁnite amount of trials which would maximize the
signal-to-noise ratio. Thus the presently employed trial matching
procedure should guarantee a suﬃciently high signal-to-noise
ratio of the experimental conditions and is well comparable
to other NCC studies. For example, Sergent et al. (2005) only
had a maximum of 96 trials for the seen and unseen condition
together, and that was before artifact rejection. Del Cul et al.
(2007) had a maximum of 128 trials for the seen and unseen
condition together before artifact rejection. Pins and Ffytche
(2003) had an estimated average of 100 trials in both seen and
unseen conditions. Furthermore, in these studies trial numbers
were reported to be only roughly equal between conditions (no
further information provided) which may bring its own problems
as described in the Section “Introduction.”
After the trial matching procedure the seen and unseen
conditions comprised 9.6 diﬀerent types of stimuli on average
(median = 10, SD = 0.6, range = 8–10), 51.1 diﬀerent individual
stimuli on average (median = 52.5, SD = 8.2, range = 31–66)
and 1.04 diﬀerent contrast levels per contrast group on average
(median = 1, SD = 0.1, range = 1–1.4). Due to the nature of
the trial matching procedure some trials (from the less numerous
condition) were included in the matched subsets on every
iteration (for seen trials: m = 29%, median = 27%, SD = 14%,
range = 9–50%; for unseen trials: m = 23%, median = 20%,
SD = 16%, range = 5–68%). Other trials were never included
because they could not be matched (for seen trials: m = 36%,
median = 39%, SD = 15%, range = 3–66%; for unseen trials:
m = 22%, median = 24%, SD = 15%, range = 0–52%). The
remaining trials were included in roughly one-third of the 100
matched sets per person (for seen trials:m= 36%,median= 38%,
SD = 7%, range = 21–49%; for unseen trials: m = 38%,
median = 34%, SD = 9%, range = 25–58%). Thus, the matched
sets comprised of 42 and 43% of all available seen and unseen
trials on average. The mean within-subject diﬀerence between the
proportion of seen and unseen trials included in the matched sets
from all available seen and unseen trials was only 1%.
For comparisons between the unseen and the catch condition
all correctly rejected catch trials and the same matched sets of
unseen trials were used. The catch condition comprised 59 trials
on average (median = 60, SD = 5.6, range = 49–68).
Cluster Permutation Tests
Diﬀerences between conditions were analyzed with non-
parametric cluster permutation tests as described in Maris and
Oostenveld (2007) and implemented in Fieldtrip. The advantage
of this method is that it identiﬁes signiﬁcant diﬀerences between
conditions as clusters evolving over electrodes and time (see
Figure A in S3 in the Supplementary Material for an example).
Thus it is well suited to study the onset of signiﬁcant diﬀerences
without predeﬁning any electrodes or time periods where the
eﬀects might occur (Picton et al., 2000). After averaging the
single trials per condition data points (electrode-time pairs) were
compared via dependent samples t-tests. Empirical distributions
were created using 10 000 random permutations of the data.
The maximal sum of t-values belonging to each cluster was
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used as the test statistic. Both the entry level for single samples
into clusters and the signiﬁcance threshold for clusters were set
at 0.025 for two-sided t-tests. Only clusters lasting longer than
15 ms were considered signiﬁcant. The choice of a duration
threshold originates from the concept of functional microstates
(ﬁrst introduced by Dietrich Lehmann3). It is based on the
observation that neural activity picked up by EEG exhibits
a succession of quasi-stable topographic conﬁgurations lasting
over tens of milliseconds. Although no precise criterion for
the minimal microstate duration exists, 15 ms was taken as a
reasonably lenient value. This was necessary because although
the data are smoothed by a low-pass ﬁlter, it can happen that the
cluster permutation test ﬁnds small signiﬁcant blobs consisting
of a few electrodes and a few milliseconds in addition to the clear
N200 and P300 components (mostly shortly before or after their
massive onset/oﬀset). These blobs are impossible to interpret and
we have thus discarded them through the adoption of a 15 ms
duration threshold.
If not speciﬁed otherwise, cluster onsets and oﬀsets
were deﬁned as the ﬁrst/last time points when at least
four neighboring electrodes showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between conditions. See S3 in the Supplementary Material for
more information on neighboring electrodes and the cluster
formation.
Denoising Single Trials
In order to increase the signal-to-noise ratio for N200 and P300
data were denoised via an algorithm using wavelet decomposition
(Quian Quiroga, 2000). This method allows the reconstruction
of ERP components on the single trial level. The signal
is ﬁrst decomposed into diﬀerent wavelets and subsequently
reconstructed using only those wavelet coeﬃcients that are
relevant for the component of interest. S4 in the Supplementary
Material illustrates some denoised trials. Two diﬀerent sets of
wavelet coeﬃcients were used for the reconstruction of the
P300 and the N200, but the same sets of coeﬃcients were used
for all subjects and all electrodes. All available seen, unseen
and catch trials were also always denoised together. For P300,
data from electrodes Fcz, C1, Cz, C2, C4, CP1, Cpz, CP2, Pz
were denoised. For N200, data from electrodes TP9, TP7, TP10,
TP8, P10, P9, O1, Oz, O2, Iz were denoised. These electrodes
were selected because results from seen-unseen comparisons
with undenoised data indicated that they constitute the most
representative electrodes for N200/P300. More speciﬁcally,
signiﬁcant diﬀerences between conditions occurred ﬁrst and
lasted longest on these electrodes.
It is important to note that this denoising method can
also be applied to data with no clear ERP signal (Quian
Quiroga and Garcia, 2003). As explained in the introduction
and also exempliﬁed in Navajas et al. (2013), there are several
reasons why event-related signals may not be apparent from
averaged data. This method oﬀers one possibility to ﬁnd out
whether any signal may still be present in the single trials
or not.
3http://www.scholarpedia.org/article/EEG_microstates
Correlation Tests
To explain the variance in gmNCC onset latencies that remained
even after denoising, single trial parameters of the two gmNCC
(N200 and P300) were extracted from each of the 100 matched
sets of trials and correlated with gmNCC onset latencies from the
respective contrastive analyses.
First, peak amplitude and peak latency was extracted from
the time period of observed variance in the onset latencies of
the gmNCC. For each trial, the positive peak between 151 and
268 ms was identiﬁed on each of the nine denoised electrodes
belonging to the P300 (Fcz, C1, Cz, C2, C4, CP1, Cpz, CP2, Pz).
Similarly, negative peaks were identiﬁed between 191 and 232 ms
for the two denoised electrodes belonging to the N200 (TP7 and
P9). These values were averaged per seen and unseen condition
for each of the 100 matched sets of trials separately. In addition
to mean peak amplitude and mean peak latency, the standard
deviation of peak latency was also computed for each matched
set. Finally, the six parameters (mean peak amplitude, mean peak
latency, and standard deviation of peak latency for both the seen
and the unseen condition) were averaged over electrodes and
subjects. Thus, a grand average of all six parameters for the N200
and the P300 per matched set was obtained. The grand averages
were then correlated with the respective onset latencies of the
N200 and the P300 as obtained from the 100 contrastive analyses
with denoised data.
In addition to the 12 correlation tests described above 4
conﬁrmatory correlation test were also carried out between
averaged ERP parameters and gmNCC onset latencies (see S5
in the Supplementary Material for details). All the p-values
(n = 16) were corrected for multiple comparisons with the
Holm–Bonferroni method.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
The false alarm rate in our study was quite low considering the
very faint stimulation. The mean percentage of seen reports for
catch trials was 4.2% (median = 2.9%, SD = 4.5%, range = 0–
17%). Mean detection rate over all stimulus types was close to
threshold as intended (m = 51%, median = 48.6%, SD = 13.8%).
The high variance in detection rate stems mostly from the fact
that contrasts were estimated separately for diﬀerent types of
stimuli. For several subjects, threshold contrast could not be
identiﬁed equally well for all stimulus types and detection rates
were therefore not always clustered evenly around the mean. S6
in the Supplementary Material lists the detection rates for all
stimulus types separately and Figure 3 depicts detection rates for
all exemplars within the diﬀerent stimulus types.
As can be seen from Figure 3, detection rates are considerably
higher for text stimuli compared to other types of stimuli. This
was due to the fact that for 12 out of 18 subjects no precise
threshold contrast value could be identiﬁed for text stimuli.
Depending on the contrast, subjects either perceived close to
none of the text stimuli or almost all of them. For those subjects
the higher contrast level was selected and this pushed the mean
detection rate up. For the other nine stimulus types threshold
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 6 February 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 23
Rutiku et al. General Markers of NCC
FIGURE 3 | Variability in detection rates for exemplars within each
stimulus type. Each colored line corresponds to one of the 10 different
stimulus types. They are numbered (on the right-hand side) in the same order
as they were listed in the methods section “Stimuli” and depicted as separate
rows in Figure 1. Exemplars 1 to 7 within each stimulus type can also be
seen from Figure 1. Every dot along the x-axis represents one of the seven
exemplars within its corresponding stimulus type. Both here and in Figure 1
exemplars are ordered according to mean detection rate for convenience of
inspection. Vertical lines represent standard errors.
contrasts could be identiﬁed more successfully, but there was still
variance between individual exemplars. Note, however, that this
variability was by and large not systematic across subjects. Most
exemplars were perceived above average by some subjects and
below average by others.
EEG Markers of Conscious Visual
Perception
The ﬁrst goal of the present study was to identify content-
independent general markers of NCC (gmNCC), i.e., markers
that distinguish consciously perceived trials of our heterogeneous
visual stimulus set from the non-perceived trials. The second goal
was to study the reliability and any possible variability in the
onset latency of these gmNCC within one study. Importantly,
when we refer to the reliability and variability of gmNCC we
speciﬁcally mean the reliability and variability of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the seen and unseen condition. We therefore
conducted a 100 contrastive analyses on matched subsets of data
in order to compare the results with regard to occurrence and
timing of the gmNCC. Figure 4 gives a representative example of
the results of one such analysis.
The most reliable diﬀerence between the seen and unseen
condition was the P300. This component was signiﬁcant in every
one of the 100 contrastive analyses and constituted a cluster of
23 electrodes on average (median = 23, SD = 1, range = 21–25).
The onset latency of the P300 component was not as consistent
as its occurrence, however. Figure 5 contains a histogram of all
observed onset latencies of the P300. It is obvious that there are
two prominent periods of onset. Mean latency of the ﬁrst onset
period was 143 ms after stimulus presentation (median = 143,
SD = 6 ms, range = 128–157). Mean latency of the second onset
period was 193 ms (median = 190, SD = 13 ms, range = 166–
223). The P300 was always signiﬁcant until the end of the tested
time period, i.e., 500 ms.
The N200 was signiﬁcant in only 81 of the 100 contrastive
analyses and constituted a cluster of 10 electrodes on average
(median = 11, SD = 3, range = 4–15). Thus, in 19% of all
cases the contrastive analysis was unable to uncover this gmNCC.
Furthermore, even if the N200 was signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between
the seen and unseen conditions its onset latency nevertheless
exhibited considerable variability. As for the P300, there are two
prominent periods of onset for the N200. Mean latency of the
ﬁrst onset period was 203 ms (median = 199 ms; SD = 9 ms,
range = 192–230 ms). Mean latency of the second onset period
was 281 ms (median = 281 ms; SD = 12 ms, range = 257–
301 ms). The duration of the N200 was also divided into two
groups. The ﬁrst group lasted 59 ms on average (median= 57 ms,
SD= 12 ms, range= 40–82 ms). The second group lasted 137 ms
on average (median = 142 ms, SD = 12 ms, range = 108–
150 ms). The mean oﬀset of statistical signiﬁcance was at 336 ms
(median = 341 ms, SD = 20 ms, range = 245–350 ms). Figure 5
contains histograms of the distributions over all iterations.
Finally, the contrastive analyses also yielded a third
component in addition to N200 and P300 which we refer
to as the late negativity (see S7 in the Supplementary Material
for a summary of the respective results). However, the onset
latency and topography of this third component suggest that it
is probably a consequence of conscious perception (Aru et al.,
2012). Another alternative explanation is that N200 together
with the primary part of P300 constitutes an early eﬀect of
conscious perception while the secondary part of P300 and the
late negativity constitute a later eﬀect of conscious experience.
We leave this problem out of the scope of the present article,
however, and will not concentrate on the late negativity any
further.
To test if the above described components are reliably evident
only for the seen condition we proceeded by comparing the
unseen condition to the catch condition. The 100 matched sets
of unseen trials were separately contrasted with all available catch
trials where the subjects reported not having seen a stimulus.
However, none of the corresponding contrastive analyses yielded
any signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Thus, it would seem that a condition
where the subject did not perceive a stimulus and a condition
where there really was no stimulus are indistinguishable in our
present dataset at a statistically signiﬁcant level.
gmNCC Onset Variability is Partly
Explained by Noise
The above described results suggest that the timing of the two
gmNCC (N200 and P300) is highly variable even within one
study, ranging over 100 ms depending on which trials are
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FIGURE 4 | Results from one representative contrastive analysis. Topographies for the seen and the unseen condition are averaged over 190–327 ms (Left)
and 328–500 ms (Right). ERPs are shown for significant clusters (N200, P300 and late negativity), averaged over all electrodes belonging to each respective cluster
(as indicated by white asterisks). Time periods where the seen and the unseen condition are significantly different from each other are colored light yellow.
FIGURE 5 | Summarized results for all contrastive analyses. ERPs are averaged over the indicated electrodes (Left). These are all the electrodes that belonged
to the respective clusters (P300 and N200) for at least one of the 100 contrastive analyses between the seen and the unseen condition. Note that because of this
averaging not all early differences between conditions – although reliable on several electrodes – may be necessarily apparent from the figure. Histograms depict the
distributions of cluster onset times over the 100 contrastive analyses. For N200 there is also a distribution of cluster offset times and of cluster duration. Note that the
distributions align with the time axes (in ms).
included in the comparisons. In some cases the N200 was even
entirely absent. It follows that some variables characterizing
single trials are responsible for the varying results and thus the
third goal of the present study was to identify these variables.
As stated in the Section “Introduction,” both the signal and the
noise proﬁles of the single trials are potentially involved. It is
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thus possible that the above described variability in results is
not related to the underlying signal proﬁle of the gmNCC at all,
but stems from nuisance factors such as an insuﬃcient signal-
to-noise ratio or an unequal noise proﬁle between conditions.
In order to rule out this possibility data from representative
electrodes were denoised via wavelets and the 100 contrastive
analyses were repeated on the same matched sets of trials as
before.
After denoising, the onset latency of statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerences again showed considerable variance, albeit with some
important diﬀerences. The previously observed early period of
P300 onsets was eﬀectively not present. Only two from the 100
iterations resulted in P300 onsets earlier than 160 ms. The mean
onset latency for the new results was 232 ms (median = 231 ms,
SD = 17 ms, range = 151–268 ms). Figure 6 contains the
distribution of all onset latencies after denoising the data. Again,
the P300 always remained signiﬁcant until the end of the tested
time period and comprised all the nine electrodes selected for
denoising on average (median = 9, SD = 0.1, range = 8–9).
Results also changed for the N200. After denoising only
two temporo-parietal electrodes showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences
between conditions. We nonetheless decided to go on with the
analyses considering clusters starting from two electrodes as
signiﬁcant. For the new results N200 was signiﬁcant on 97% of the
iterations and included three electrodes on average (median = 2,
SD = 2, max = 9). The mean onset latency was 208 ms
(median = 203 ms, SD = 12 ms, range = 191–232 ms). The
mean oﬀset latency was 313 ms (median = 317 ms, SD = 15 ms,
range = 261–342 ms). Thus, the mean duration of the N200 was
105 ms (median = 111 ms, SD = 23 ms, range = 39–141 ms).
Figure 6 contains histograms of the respective distributions. Note
that the N200 onset and duration displayed a highly negative
correlation [r = –0.8, t(95) = –12.95, p = 2.2e – 16).
To examine if the N200 and the P300 are reliably evident
only for the seen condition a separate group of a 100 contrastive
analyses comparing the unseen condition to the catch condition
were performed. Denoised data were analyzed from the same
groups of electrodes as for the seen-unseen comparisons. Recall
that no corresponding diﬀerences for the undenoised data were
found, but perhaps the removal of noise will bring to light some
subliminal processing of the stimulus in the unseen condition
that was previously missed.
As for the undenoised data, there were no signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the unseen and catch conditions on the
central P300 electrodes for the denoised data. Thus, the P300
seems indeed to be reliably evident only for the seen condition.
The same is not quite true for N200, however. Results revealed
a small but quite consistent negative component on an occipital
cluster of electrodes. Note that these are not the same electrodes
that were most reliable in the seen-unseen comparison. The
occipital cluster was signiﬁcant on 91% of the iterations and
included three electrodes on average (median = 3, SD = 0.21,
max = 4). The mean onset latency of statistical signiﬁcance
was 254 ms (median = 256 ms, SD = 17 ms, range = 166–
268 ms). The mean oﬀset latency was 302 ms (median = 300 ms,
SD = 28 ms, range = 279–491 ms). Thus, the mean duration
of the occipital negative cluster was 48 ms (median = 43 ms,
SD = 33 ms, range = 20–235 ms). Figure 6 contains histograms
of the respective distributions. Results thus suggest that a negative
cluster on occipital electrodes can reliably diﬀerentiate the unseen
condition from the catch condition around 250 ms after stimulus
onset.
gmNCC Onset Variability Explained by
Single Trial Parameters
Results from the previous section indicate that some variability
in the gmNCC onset latencies remains even if noise is eﬀectively
removed from the data. Thus, some parameters of the gmNCC
signal proﬁle must also be involved in the observed variance
(see “Introduction” for a description and some theoretical
implications of the possible parameters) and it is the third goal of
the present study to identify these parameters. Having the list of
100 varying onset times of N200 and P300 one can therefore ask
what is diﬀerent between the matched sets of trials that underlie
each of these 100 contrastive analyses.
To answer this question, we ﬁrst extracted peak amplitude and
peak latency of N200 and P300 from the time period of observed
variability in onset latencies for both components. Then, grand
averages of mean peak amplitude, mean peak latency, and mean
latency variance were calculated separately for the seen and
the unseen trials and for each of the 100 matched sets, to
be subsequently correlated with the 100 diﬀerent cluster onset
latencies (see “Correlation Tests” for more details).
It is important to note that we are presently not analyzing the
peaks of the N200 and the P300 components. Because, we are
interested in the time period of gmNCC onsets we cannot hope
to accurately capture the peaks of the corresponding components
in that time window. Our aim is somewhat diﬀerent. We are
trying to understand what happens in the single trials at the
time when variance is observed between the 100 contrastive
analyses. We are trying to do this by looking at maximal activity
in that time window. Because we already have conducted the
contrastive analyses, we know that some variables must exist that
are responsible for the diﬀerences in results. We are now simply
taking our analysis one step further by trying to identify these
variables.
Figure 7 illustrates the results of all conducted correlation
tests. The onset times of P300 correlated signiﬁcantly neither with
mean peak latency of the seen trials (r = –0.05, t = –0.52, p= 1.0)
nor withmean peak latency of the unseen trials (r= 0.15, t= 1.54,
p= 0.76). The respective correlations with mean latency variance
were also not signiﬁcant (r = 0.04, t = 0.43, p = 1.0 for seen
trials; r = –0.02, t = –0.21, p= 1.0 for unseen trials). There was a
moderately signiﬁcant correlation with mean peak amplitude for
seen trials (r = –0.3, t = –3.07, p= 0.031), but themost signiﬁcant
correlation was found withmean peak amplitude for unseen trials
(r = 0.5, t = 5.67, p = 2.2e – 06).
Results were very similar for N200. The onset times of N200
did not correlate signiﬁcantly with mean peak latency for the
seen nor for the unseen trials (r = –0.02, t = –0.18, p = 1.0 and
r = 0.01, t = 0.09, p = 1.0, respectively). The correlations with
mean latency variance were also not signiﬁcant (r= 0.22, t= 2.25,
p = 0.21 for seen trials; r = –0.23, t = –2.26, p = 0.21 for unseen
trials). The correlations with mean peak amplitudes of the seen
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FIGURE 6 | Summarized results for all contrastive analyses after denoising. Denoised data is averaged over the indicated electrodes (Left). These are all the
electrodes that are most representative for the respective clusters (P300 and N200 for the seen–unseen comparisons; N200 for the unseen–catch comparisons).
Histograms depict the distributions of gmNCC onset times, offset times and durations over the 100 different contrastive analyses. The distributions align with the
time axes (in ms).
and the unseen trials were again signiﬁcant (r = 0.34, t = 3.49,
p = 0.009 and r = –0.48, t = –5.4, p = 7e – 06, respectively).
To exclude any possible confounds with latency variance and
to demonstrate more convincingly the relevance of the amplitude
parameter for the observed variability in gmNCC onset times, the
above analysis was repeated by ﬁrst averaging single trials and
then extracting peak amplitude. The results are presented in S5
in the Supplementary Material.
Finally, to be sure that the above described results are
meaningful and do not derive from the simple fact that any
activity in the unseen condition – if at all present – is much
weaker compared to the seen condition we repeated all the
contrastive analyses and correlation tests, but replaced the post-
stimulus time window of the unseen condition with baseline data.
Results are described in S8 in the Supplementary Material. These
analyses show that both for the P300 and N200 variability in onset
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FIGURE 7 | Correlations between gmNCC onset times and single trial parameters. Grand averages of single trial N200/P300 parameters (amplitude, latency,
and standard deviation of latency) were correlated with N200/P300 onset times (indicated in ms on the y-axes). Correlation tests are carried out separately for seen
and unseen trials. ∗P < 0.05; ∗∗P < 0.01; ∗∗∗P < 0.001.
latencies is much decreased compared to the results presented
above and no signiﬁcant correlations with mean peak amplitude
of the “unseen” condition (i.e., baseline activity) remain.
We conclude that besides noise the varying onset times of
the two gmNCC are ﬁrst and foremost explained by amplitude
variability in the unseen trials, although amplitude variability in
the seen trials has an eﬀect as well. If the range of mean peak
amplitude values for the seen and the unseen trials in Figure 7
are compared, it can be noticed that mean peak amplitude of the
unseen trials varies over a wider range than mean peak amplitude
of the seen trials. Thus, it is not surprising that this variability is
reﬂected in the onset times of signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
seen and the unseen condition.
Importantly, there is no evident connection between gmNCC
onset times and latency parameters. And indeed, if one takes
a look at the distributions of mean peak P300 and mean peak
N200 latencies in Figure 7, one can observe that the variability
is very small in absolute numbers. It seems that the mean peak
latencies of the two gmNCC are very similar across the diﬀerent
matched sets of trials. The distributions of mean latency variance
for P300 and N200 in Figure 7 make it clear that peak latency
shifts considerably over single trials, but mean latency variance is
again very similar across the 100 diﬀerent sets of trials.
One of our goals was to study the reliability and any possible
variability in the onset latency of gmNCC. The presently reported
results bring us closer to an informed answer. We now know that
it is not very accurate to only use the onset time of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences between the seen and the unseen condition for an
estimate of gmNCC latency because this kind of latency estimate
may well vary with amplitude ﬂuctuations. In fact, one can
disregard a lot of the variance in cluster onset times, because
it is caused by possibly irrelevant amplitude ﬂuctuations in the
unseen condition. Nevertheless, one cannot fully disentangle
the contribution of mean amplitude for the seen trials from
the contribution of mean amplitude for the unseen trials. Both
vary and both have an eﬀect on the onset time of signiﬁcant
diﬀerences.
With this in mind, the best and most reliable estimate
for the latencies of our two gmNCCs should not be based
solely on results from the contrastive analysis, but also on
original latency values for the seen trials in the time window
of signiﬁcance onsets, because these seem to stay surprisingly
homogeneous over diﬀerent sets of trials. Presently, we will use
mean peak latency to make the best estimates. For N200 latency
the respective estimate is 213 ms (SD over subjects = 2.2 ms,
range = 210–218 ms). For P300 latency the estimate is 216 ms
(SD over subjects = 5.5 ms, range = 209–227 ms). Whether
the components will be signiﬁcant at these time points in
a given seen–unseen comparison depends a lot on mean
amplitudes of the speciﬁc selection of the seen and unseen trials
included in the comparison. But the mean peak latency of these
gmNCC gives an idea of what is going on in the seen trials
alone.
General vs. Specific Markers of NCC
Although the aim of this study was to ﬁnd and describe content-
independent general markers of conscious perception it must be
noted that not all NCC have to be general. There might exist
speciﬁc markers of conscious perception which are associated
with certain stimulus types only (e.g., N170 for faces; Navajas
et al., 2013). Our rationale was to capitalize on a heterogeneous
stimulus set so that no stimulus speciﬁc markers (whether NCC-
pr, NCC proper, and/or NCC-co) could overpower the results
and only their common denominators would survive. Thus,
we presently did not aim to diﬀerentiate between general and
speciﬁc markers of conscious perception nor to investigate them
parametrically. These questions will have to be addressed in
future research.
On the other hand, even if a marker is in essence the same
for diﬀerent stimulus types (i.e., it marks the same underlying
neural process) its latency and/or amplitude may probably
still vary due to stimulus characteristics or perceptual quality.
We have conducted some preliminary analysis in this regard
as far as the dataset allows. Comparisons between diﬀerent
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subgroups of stimulus types and between stimuli with higher or
lower detection rates are presented in S9 in the Supplementary
Material. These results do not indicate any inﬂuence of
stimulus characteristics on N200 and P300 amplitude/latency.
However, diﬀerences in detection rate seem to be associated with
systematic amplitude and/or latency modulations for both N200
and P300.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The ﬁrst goal of the present experiment was to ﬁnd general
markers of NCC (gmNCC), that is – markers that distinguish
consciously perceived trials of a heterogenous visual stimulus
set from the non-perceived trials. The second goal was to study
how much these gmNCC vary within one experiment. The
third goal was to characterize the causes of this variability.
A heterogeneous visual stimulus set was used, presented at a
near-threshold contrast. Thus, our paradigm was designed to
reduce the inﬂuence of stimulus predictability and categorical
speciﬁcity. One hundred diﬀerent matched subsets of the
resulting seen and unseen trials were contrasted to identify
the gmNCC, to study their reliability and variability of their
timing. Results indicate that N200 and P300 are the two gmNCC
for our paradigm, but their onset latency exhibits considerable
variability.
Generality of Various NCC
Diﬀerences in the occurrence and onset latency of NCC observed
between studies has previously been explained with diﬀerences
in stimulus material and tasks (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010;
Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). One explanation is that
depending on how visual awareness is manipulated and assessed
within a given paradigm, neural prerequisites (NCC-pr) and
neural consequences (NCC-co) speciﬁc to that paradigm may
be misclassiﬁed as NCC proper, when the contrastive method
is used (Aru et al., 2012; de Graaf et al., 2012). We were
able to show, however, that NCC can vary even within one
study where the paradigm, stimulus material and recording
conditions were kept constant. Admittedly, the present paradigm
is also not suﬃciently free from possible confounding factors
so as to conﬁdently argue that N200 and P300 really are the
NCC proper. We can only argue that for our study these ERP
components which may be markers of any one of the three
subtypes of NCC are general enough so that they do not emerge
as related to some narrow visual categorical stimulus group.
For this reason, we call them general markers of NCC. The
problem is simply that besides general NCC proper there might
also exist general NCC-pr or general NCC-co. On the other
hand, even with regard to the NCC proper, we should not
think that conscious experience marked by it must be invariant
and narrowly ﬁxed in time. Conscious experience of the target
stimulus need not be indicated by a certain type of strictly
deﬁned NCC, but could be understood as a successful evolution
of necessarily required neural events over time (see Bachmann,
2000; Navajas et al., 2013; Schurger et al., 2015 for similar
arguments).
The P300 component is a well-known marker of conscious
perception. It has been found in almost all electrophysiological
studies investigating the ERP-correlates of consciousness. Only
when the same experimental stimuli are presented repeatedly
(Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2008; Sekar et al., 2013) or when one
has prior knowledge about the presented stimulus (Melloni et al.,
2011) does the P300 increment not occur as a diﬀerence between
trials with and without conscious perception. As P300 might
reﬂect updating of working memory (Polich, 2007), which is
arguably not much needed when the very same stimuli are
already encoded in working memory, P300 is not a marker
of conscious perception under such experimental conditions
(Melloni et al., 2011, but see Rutiku et al., 2015). For the
present study stimuli were deliberately unpredictable. Thus,
in light of the argumentation presented above it is possible
that the P300 is not a gmNCC proper, but rather reﬂects a
general process following the NCC proper, i.e., it represents the
NCC-co.
The N200 has also been found as a marker of conscious
perception, but not as often as the P300. In many studies
the N200 is not reliably diﬀerent between conditions with and
without conscious awareness (Sergent et al., 2005; Del Cul et al.,
2007). The present results oﬀer an explanation for these varying
results. As the reliability of this marker of conscious perception
depends on which single trials are included in the seen as well
as the unseen condition it is possible that previous studies have
simply missed it. This possibility has also been noted by other
researchers (Del Cul et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the present results
are diﬀerent because there is no clear N200 component present
in the unseen condition. Studies using stronger stimuli ﬁnd a
well pronounced N200 which is not diﬀerent between conditions
(Sergent et al., 2005; Del Cul et al., 2007). Thus, one might
argue that the N200 reﬂects a general process preceding the NCC
proper.
Yet, it seems for the undenoised data that the average onset of
P300 occurs somewhat earlier than the average onset of N200.
This would be in conﬂict with the view that N200 reﬂects a
pre-conscious process prior to the NCC proper or NCC-co,
which is P300. Another interesting observation is that both
components show two periods of onset for the undenoised
data. One explanation for these results is that the abnormally
distributed results are due to a confounding signal in the
measurements (e.g., alpha oscillations) and are actually not a
property of the gmNCC per se. The current results favor this
explanation, because after denoising the relevant single trial
data, the discrepant periods of onset disappear. After denoising
both components are still reliably associated with conscious
perception, but they show one fairly similar period of onset which
falls around 200 ms after stimulus presentation. Thus, noise
seems to explain a big part of the initial variability in gmNCC
onset latencies and the extremely early onset latencies of the P300
in particular.
Despite the fact that the very early period of P300 onsets
disappeared after denoising the EEG signal it is noteworthy
that P300 still sets on somewhat earlier than is typically
estimated in other relevant studies (around 270 ms in Del Cul
et al., 2007, for example). One explanation for this discrepancy
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may be that we are presently not capturing speciﬁcally the
onset latency of the P3b subcomponent which is arguably the
most relevant P300 subcomponent for conscious perception
(Dehaene and Changeux, 2011). P300 also has a somewhat
earlier subcomponent – the P3a. It is evident on fronto-
central electrodes and is hypothesized to reﬂect automatic
and possibly non-conscious orienting responses (e.g., Muller-
Gass et al., 2007). Perhaps in our study a stronger P3a
response occurs for the consciously perceived stimuli and
this is the earliest critical diﬀerence within the P300 that
we capture with our contrastive analyses. In that case the
earliest part of P300 may just as well reﬂect a general
process of gnNCCpr preceding the NCC proper for our
paradigm.
gmNCC Onset Variability Explained
After noise was removed from the data we were able to
show that variance in the gmNCC onset latency could be ﬁrst
and foremost attributed to amplitude variance in the unseen
condition. Amplitude variance in the seen condition was also
associated with the varying gmNCC onsets, albeit to a lesser
extent. It is important to note, however, that not only were there
no clear N200 and P300 components in the unseen condition,
but there really were no clearly pronounced ERP components
associated with the unseen condition at all (see Ojanen et al., 2003
for similar results). Thus, the question arises whether this fact in
itself could explain the results showing that most of the variance
in gmNCC onset latencies came from the unseen condition. To
test this possibility we repeated all the analyses after replacing the
post-stimulus data of the unseen condition with baseline data.
This lead to a marked decrease of variability in gmNCC onset
latencies compared to results with actual data and the absence
of signiﬁcant correlations with the amplitude of the unseen
condition (i.e., baseline activity) remained. This fact speaks
against the possible confound of an unequal signal-to-noise ratio
between the seen and the unseen condition in the present study.
Furthermore, despite the lack of any clear ERP components in the
unseen condition it still exhibited reliable diﬀerences with respect
to the catch condition on occipital electrodes around 250 ms after
stimulus presentation – supporting the assumption that there is
a weak signal and thus a weak ERP in the unseen condition.
The activity may just be too weak to form a clear component on
the ERP.
Although the same occipital electrodes that diﬀerentiated
the unseen condition from the catch condition sometimes also
showed signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the seen and the unseen
condition, these were not the most reliable electrodes for the
N200 of conscious visual perception. N200 was most reliable on
left temporo-parietal electrodes in the present study. Thus, one
additional possibility why some previous works have not found
the N200 as a marker of conscious perception could be because
it is mixed up with other posteriorly recorded components that
have similar latencies, but are not necessarily associated with
conscious perception.
Taken together, the results reported in this study suggest that
signal properties of the unseen condition (amplitude ﬂuctuations
in particular) can have a noteworthy impact on the results
of a contrastive analysis. Although such eﬀects are generally
expected their extent has not been thoroughly investigated in
previous studies. However, the present study is comparable
to another recent study (Schurger et al., 2015). The authors
of this study elegantly showed that the pattern of activity in
response to unseen stimuli is less stable within and between
trials than the pattern of activity in response to seen trials. Thus,
instability may be a property of unconscious neural responses
while stability constitutes a hallmark of conscious perception.
Our results conﬁrm this assumption, but in addition show that
because of this diﬀerence in stability comparisons between the
seen and unseen condition can yield widely varying results
in terms of when and where signiﬁcant diﬀerences begin to
occur.
Theoretical Implications
The P300 as a marker of consciousness is most consistent with
the theory of a global workspace consisting of multiple areas
including frontal, parietal, and temporal cortices (Dehaene et al.,
1998, 2003). We cannot say anything certain about the sources
of our P300, but since it is a well-studied component one can be
fairly conﬁdent that a similar multi-focal network is underlying
the P300 of the present study.
The N200 is consistent with the visual awareness negativity
(Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2003; Wilenius-Emet et al., 2004)
concept and the idea of posterior local recurrent activity (Lamme
and Roelfsema, 2000). Our N200 component occurs somewhat
later than the usual N200 reported previously. This may be
due to the faint stimulation. A similar explanation is oﬀered by
Sekar et al. (2013). The facts showing that ERP correlates of
correct perception have been found at a shorter latency range
exempliﬁed by N100-150 (Bachmann, 1994) can be explained as a
result of the considerably higher contrast/intensity of the stimuli
used, which leads to the speed-up of awareness-related processing
and shorter latencies of the negative ERP components reﬂecting
this.
We also did not observe early EEG components in the seen
condition (e.g., N100) for the present paradigm. Again, it is likely
that these signals are too faint and/or unreliable for the low
contrast stimuli used in the present study. This interpretation
is backed up by another study (Sekar et al., 2013) where weak
stimulation was used. The resulting very small post-stimulus
brain response at 100 ms did not diﬀer between conditions at
a statistically signiﬁcant level. Thus, the present results conﬁrm
that such early responses do not seem to be markers of direct
conscious perception of near-threshold stimuli.
Taken together, our ﬁndings show that if a set of
heterogeneous stimuli is used, whose identity cannot be
predicted by the subject, the two widely reported correlates of
consciousness – the N200 and P300 – are reliably observed.
However, the onset latencies of these components still showed
large variability. Importantly, part of this variability can be
attributed to the particular set of trials selected for the condition
without conscious perception. These results indicate that any
conclusions about the NCC onset timing that are based on data
from a single study with its speciﬁc stimuli and procedure, are
likely to be misleading.
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